EG Weighting Districts by Wallin, Ray J
1 
 
 
 
EG WEIGHTED DISTRICTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 RAY J WALLIN  
 
JANUARY 1, 2017 
corrections/feedback welcome:  rayjwallin01@gmail.com 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
 Ray J Wallin has been active in local politics in Saint Paul and Minneapolis, MN, writing 
and providing research to local campaigns. He has an engineering degree and an MBA in 
marketing.  
 
 
2 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Somehow, Arxiv continues to flag this paper in Google searches as my WDM 
paper. (I will not expand the acronym here so it will not show up in additional searches.)  
This paper is a tiny section of an old working model and is of little value. For the full 
WDM paper, please see: 
 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3308888  
 
Thank You. 
 
 
This past decade has seen a noticeable uptick in asymmetric election results along 
with the inevitable claims of gerrymandering and litigation. Research, too, has 
followed, giving rise to intense scrutiny of elections, where the goal is to understand 
not only what goes into gerrymandering, but how to measure what comes out. 
Perhaps the most cited symmetry measure of this decade is the EG. The EG has 
been commonplace in gerrymandering litigation nationwide and the focus of numerous 
articles, both popular and scholarly. This article shows how the EG can be represented 
as a weighting function.  
 
  
3 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Our courts have long expressed a desire for a consistent, accurate gerrymandering 
measure. Deprived of a benchmark, guidance from the courts is reduced to individual 
rulings which are too often viewed by the public as partisan no matter the verdict. These 
case-by-case decisions bring the possibility of tamping down gerrymandering activity 
in a whack-a-mole fashion, but lack a broader interpretation to be systematically applied 
in lower court rulings or in the redistricting process as a line not to be crossed.  
 When the judicial branch dictates the actions of the legislative branch, lines must 
be clear, which is likely the reason the Supreme Court continues to insist on a viable 
standard to be applied across the board. 
In the 1986 Davis v. Bandemer opinion, the Supreme Court agreed that partisan 
gerrymandering claims are justiciable yet found no standard to rule by.1 Two decades 
later, the Vieth v. Jubelirer decision of 2004 and LULAC in 2006 effectively reaffirmed 
the mantra,2 that the Court remains open to a standard but has found none.  
The restraint exhibited in Vieth and LULAC relaxed judicial pressure on 
redistricters to draw fair maps which may have led to the rise in unbalanced redistricting 
plans following the 2010 census. But whatever the reason, this decade’s lopsided 
election results produced an unceasing wave of public outcry with litigation following 
fast on its heels.    
The few cases ruled on by the Supreme Court in the summer of 2018 were hoped 
by the gerrymandering reform community to bring verdicts of gerrymandering along 
with new measurement standards. What actually happened was foreseen by few. The 
effects of the Supreme Court’s actions were negligible as they essentially handed the 
cases, and the problem of gerrymandering, back to the lower courts.  
This article presents the EG weighting function, breaking apart the EG equations 
to plot them and evaluate a plan via a partisan symmetry measure which evaluates each 
district.  
he goal of a gerrymander is to cluster one party’s districts in the sweet-spot where 
seats are relatively safe from flipping though not yet packed with their own votes. 
Packing a few districts with opposition votes frees up more gerrymandering party votes 
in surrounding districts, ideally giving them more safe-seats.  
  
                                                          
1  Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. (1986)        
2 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. (2004); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry 
(LULAC), 548 U.S. (2006) 
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I. THE EG WEIGHTING FUNCTION    
 
Table 1 
WDM and EG results for a Hypothetical Four-District State, Unshifted Data 
Ddist is the Democratic district vote-share and Pw is the percentage of WV 
 
   
Table 2 
WDM and EG results for a Hypothetical Four-District State 
after a uniform vote-shift of 2 points 
 
      
The EG method was introduced in 2014 and has featured prominently in this 
decade’s volley of court cases. In the court’s opinion of the League of Women Voters v. 
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,3 the EG is mentioned over 40 times. In the 
opinion of League of Women Voters v. Rucho in North Carolina, the EG is mentioned 
over 80 times.4 In Wisconsin’s Whitford v. Gill, the lower court opinion mentions the 
EG over 200 times while the SCOTUS Whitford opinion tones this down to just over a 
dozen.5        
This section shows how the EG, which is typically presented as the percentage of 
WV in a state, is better understood as a weighting function. That is, the EG weights 
each district according to its Democratic vote-share, Ddist. 
Table 1 represents a four-district hypothetical state that elected 2 Democrats and 2 
Republicans. The Democratic statewide vote-share is V = 54%. From there, two votes 
                                                          
3 League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 175 (Pa. 2018) 
4 Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 (M.D.N.C. 2018) 
5 District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin Remedial Opinion, Whitford v. Gill 
(2016); Gill v Whitford, 585 U.S. (2018)  
WDM
District D R Total Ddist D R Total Pw Weight
1 39 61 100 39% 39 11 -28 -28% -24
2 49 51 100 49% 49 1 -48 -48% -5
3 59 41 100 59% 9 41 32 32% 25
4 69 31 100 69% 19 31 12 12% 12
216 184 400 116 84 -32
V = 54.0% EG = -8.0%
Votes Wasted Votes
Party Party
    W = 2.0
WDM
District D R Total Ddist D R Total Pw Weight
1 41 59 100 41% 41 9 -32 -32% -25
2 51 49 100 51% 1 49 48 48% 5
3 61 39 100 61% 11 39 28 28% 24
4 71 29 100 71% 21 29 8 8% 8
224 176 400 74 126 52
V = 56.0% EG = 13.0%     W = 3.0
Party Party
Votes Wasted Votes
5 
 
from each Republican candidate are shifted to the Democratic candidate to give Table 
2 where the statewide Democratic vote increases to V = 56% and 3 Democrats are 
elected. 
A district’s total number of WV is calculated via either Equation 1 or 2, depending 
on whether the Republican or Democrat candidate wins the election. The first term of 
each equation is the number of Republican WV and the second term is the number of 
Democratic WV. The difference between these terms is the total number of WV in the 
district.  
 
𝑊𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 = (𝑅 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 − 𝐷 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠) / 2 −  𝐷 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠       R candidate wins  (1) 
 
𝑊𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 = 𝑅 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 −  (𝐷 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 − 𝑅 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠) / 2        D candidate wins  (2) 
 
The EG is usually presented as the percentage of statewide WV in relation to the 
total number of statewide votes. Equivalently, the EG can be calculated as the average 
of Pw, the district percentage of WV.6 Rewriting Equations 1 and 2 in terms of Pw and 
Ddist, we arrive at Equations 3 and 4. 
 
𝑃𝑤  =   − 50% −   2 ( 𝐷𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡  −   50% )           𝐷𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 < 50%                       (3) 
 
𝑃𝑤  =       50% −   2 ( 𝐷𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡  −   50% )           𝐷𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 > 50%                       (4) 
 
 
  
                                                          
6 Ibid, 853. McGhee at times uses district vote share (Equations 3 and 4) to calculate the EG 
and at other times uses the actual vote count. To eliminate turnout-bias from measurements, this 
article uses district vote-share; Turnout-bias arises from the use of actual votes instead of the 
percentage of votes and often skews results in Democrats favor by a percentage point or two. 
Michael D McDonald and Robin E Best, “Unfair Partisan Gerrymanders in Politics and Law: A 
Diagnostic Applied to Six Cases,” Election Law Journal 14, no. 4 (December 17, 2015): 19, 
https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2015.0358.; Discusses sources of turnout-bias. Michael D. 
McDonald, “The Arithmetic of Electoral Bias, with Applications to U.S. House Elections,” 
APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, 2009.; Uses actual votes in calculations, acknowledging 
they introduce slight turnout-bias. John F. Nagle, “Measures of Partisan Bias for Legislating Fair 
Elections,” Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 14, no. 4 (November 19, 2015): 
346–60, https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2015.0311. 
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Figure 1 
EG Weighting Function   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 EG Response to Uniform Vote-shift 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equations 3 and 4 are defined as the EG weighting function as they assign a weight 
(Pw) to each district according to its vote-share. This weighting function, plotted in 
Figure 1,7 illustrates which districts have the most WV (heavier weight) and which have 
the least (lighter weight).  
Districts near the EG crossover points of Ddist = 25% and 75% have near-zero WV. 
In contrast, closely contested elections and packed districts are weighted heavily, either 
positively or negatively, by the EG. In reality, few districts are so severely packed that 
more than, say 95% of the voters are from one party, which means the most heavily 
weighted districts in most plans will be near the Ddist = 50% discontinuity in the 
                                                          
7 Similar plots can be found in literature. For instance, see: Benjamin Plener Cover, 
“Quantifying Partisan Gerrymandering: An Evaluation of the EG Proposal,” Stanford Law 
Review 70 (2018): 1131. 
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weighting function. Apart from the discontinuity, the slope of the weighting function is 
-2.  
Individual district weights from Tables 1 and 2 are plotted in Figure 1 as circles 
and crosses, respectively. The vote-shift from Table 1 to Table 2 causes the weight to 
drop by 4 points in districts 1, 3, and 4, where no seat has flipped. The district 2 seat 
did flip, and though the magnitude of its weight did not change, the sign did, and the 
district jumps from nearly the lowest weight to nearly the highest, an increase of 96 
points. In Table 1, EG = -8%, indicating that the state is gerrymandered to favor 
Republicans. In Table 2, EG = 13%, indicating that the state is gerrymandered to favor 
Democrats. The change in this district’s weight is the major influence in the EG’s jump 
of 21 points. 
From there, a vote-shift analysis, shown in Figure 2, is performed to show EG 
behavior in relation to changes in voter behavior. By uniformly shifting district votes in 
Table 1, V is varied from 30% to 70% and the EG for each vote-share is plotted as the 
black sawtooth curve in Figure 2. The EG values of -8% and +13% from Tables 1 and 
2 are plotted as black squares. The sawtooth behavior of the graph comes from the EG’s 
response to a flipped seat. When a seat flips, the EG jumps 25% (one of four seats), or 
three times the EG gerrymandering threshold of ±7%. From one side of a jump to the 
other, the EG measures the plan quite differently, yet little has changed in the state, 
including the overall vote-share.8  
  
                                                          
8 Discusses the erratic behavior of the EG. Mira Bernstein and Moon Duchin, “A Formula 
Goes to Court: Partisan Gerrymandering and the EG,” Notices of the American Mathematical 
Society 64, no. 09 (October 1, 2017): 1020–24, https://doi.org/10.1090/noti1573. 
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II. DISCUSSION   
 
Thirty years have passed since the Supreme Court expressed interest in a viable 
gerrymandering standard. To date, all measures presented before it have fallen short of 
expectations.  
Politicians desire safe-seats. A gerrymander creates an abundance of safe-seats by 
siphoning party votes from opposition districts. The EG can be used as a weighting 
function.  Plotting individual district weights as a function of vote-share allows the user 
and the courts a view of an entire election cycle in one picture. 
Our courts look for durable gerrymanders. A measure of gerrymandering must be 
explicit, comprehensible, and produce stable results.  
 
